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Abstract: In this paper, we are going to report on the results of an exploratory piece 
of research about the typical front-end-related activities in 28 innovation projects 
carried out by 14 German and 13 Japanese companies to reduce project uncertainty. In 
all cases we observed a range of activities to reduce project specific risks and revealed 
differences in the practice of innovation management in both the German and 
Japanese companies. We interviewed managers of 13 Japanese and 14 German 
enterprises concerning 14 Japanese and 14 German New Product Development 
projects. The focus of our research was the so called “fuzzy front end”, activities and 
typical deliverables in the innovation process which might be affected by front end 
management practice.  
Overall, in the case of the German as well as the Japanese projects, the uncertainties 
affected by the market or technology could successfully be reduced during the “fuzzy 
front end” and the majority of projects achieved their objectives and efficiency 
targets. Nevertheless, our study revealed differences in the way such uncertainties 
were reduced by the companies in Japan and Germany. Generally speaking, the 14 
Japanese projects relied on a thorough planning, delegation of front end activities and 
strict controlling mechanisms to minimize deviations from front end specifications 
later in the innovation process and hence, achieved efficiency. In contrast, in the 
majority of the 14 German projects we could neither observe such a formal planning 
nor such an intensive controlling procedure supported by methods and tools as in the 
case of the Japanese projects. Instead, the companies in our German sample integrated 
relevant functions like R&D, marketing, sales, production or customer service from 
the beginning of the innovation process, usually already during the idea generation 
phase, to ensure that all critical information and perspectives were taken into 
consideration right from the beginning, to reduce uncertainties and later deviations as 
well as enhancing efficiency. Responsibilities were assigned during the fuzzy front 
end and rarely changed during the implementation of the project.  
 Keywords: Fuzzy front end; innovation risk, uncertainty; idea generation; project 
selection; project planning; Japan; Germany. 
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1  Introduction 
1.1  The fuzzy front end 
Recently, researchers and practitioners in the field of innovation management are 
paying more attention to the so called “fuzzy front end” of product development, also 
known as the “pre-development” phase [1], “pre-project activities” [2], or “pre-phase 
0” [3, 4]. Managers have identified the front end as being the greatest weakness in 
product innovation [3, p. 103]. Why? Because it strongly determines which projects 
will be executed, and furthermore the quality, costs, and time frame are to a large 
extent defined here. But research in this field has clearly demonstrated that efforts to 
optimize the innovation process at this stage in practice are minimal. In contrast, 
effects on the overall efficiency and effectiveness of the whole innovation process are 
significant [5, p. 100]. Consistent with these findings, an extensive empirical study by 
Cooper and Kleinschmidt showed that “the greatest differences between winners and 
losers were found in the quality of execution of pre-development activities” [1, p. 26]. 
Two factors were identified as playing a major role in product success: the quality of 
executing the pre-development activities, and a well defined product and project prior 
to the development phase [6, p. 27].  
A study of 788 new product launches in Japan confirmed that Japanese new product 
professionals view the importance of pre-development proficiency in much the same 
way as their American and European counterparts [7, pp. 422, 433]. 
In general, the front end ranges from the generation of an idea to either its approval 
for development or its termination [8]. Figure 1 shows a simplified figure of the 
product development process to demonstrate the stage in which the fuzzy front end 
plays a role in the innovation process. The product development process starts with an 
idea originating from basic research, customer based techniques, and creativity 
techniques [6, p. 45]. During phase I, the idea is evaluated. This could be an iterative 
process, where the idea is worked out in more detail and assessed in several steps. For 
instance, an initial rough assessment could be made according to “must meet” and 
“should meet” criteria such as strategic alignment, feasibility or company policy ‘fit’. 
Following a more detailed investigation, it is typical for a quick and inexpensive 
assessment of the project in terms of market, technology, and financials to take place. 
Phase II tasks are the development of a more detailed product concept and the initial 
project planning. Output of the fuzzy front end is a detailed business plan which is the 4 
basis for the decision on a business case. The “later phases” commence with phase III, 




Figure 1: The product development process  
1.2  Reducing uncertainty in the front end of innovation 
Product development and the processes behind it can be seen as a series of activities 
related to problem solving. The more radical the product or process innovation, the 
more complex and iterative the problem solving process or the innovation process 
behind it. Typical risks jeopardizing the success of innovation for example, include 
inaccurate estimates of the future market demand, failing to develop the technology as 
planned or in extreme cases, a combination of both. 
In the product development process relevant information has to be gathered in order to 
reduce such risks and uncertainties [9, pp. 252–254, 10, p. 228]. Uncertainty is 
defined as “the difference between the amount of information required to perform a 
particular task, and the amount of information already possessed by the organization” 
[11, p. 5]. The more that a risk or uncertainty can be reduced during the front end of 
this process, the lower the deviations from front end specifications, during the 
following project execution phases and hence, the higher the product development 
success. 
Uncertainties inherent in New Product Development projects relate to the market and 
technology (see figure 2). The amount of information required very much depends on 
the type of New Product Development Project. Why? The highest level of newness to 
a firm is implied in the term radical innovation with an uncertainty in terms of both 
the market and the technology (upper right quadrant of figure 2).  In contrast, 
incremental innovations like small product improvements tend to rely on existing 
internal information.  Market and technical innovation can revert to existing 
knowledge in one dimension, whilst the other dimension is highly uncertain. 
Examples of this are the penetration of new markets with existing products, or the 
replacement of an obsolete technology inherent in a product without changing product 





















Figure 2: Uncertainty matrix [source: 12, p. 13, modified by the authors] 
Therefore, the degree of newness of a New Product Development project to a firm is 
an important contextual factor, which influences how uncertainties are reduced during 
the product development process [13, p. 285, 14, pp. 536–539, 15, p. 132, 9, p. 253, 
16, p. 304, 17, p. 318]. If information is not yet available and has to be sought from 
secondary sources, a different approach is needed to acquire this information. For 
example, when the newness of the market and technology to the firm are high, 
identifying customer needs and translating them into a product’s technical 
specifications are much more challenging, and these activities will require completely 
different marketing and technical capabilities than would be needed if the newness to 
the firm is low [18, p. 73].  
1.3  Cultural differences 
In addition to the firm’s perceived degree of newness of the planned product 
innovation, other factors such as branch specific or cultural differences might have an 
impact on the new product development process and particularly on the way 
uncertainties are reduced during the fuzzy front end phase. 
Although often criticized, findings from Hofstede and others indicate a difference 
between cultures with regard to uncertainty avoidance [18, 19]. Uncertainty avoidance 
according to Hofstede, measures the extent to which individuals are able to tolerate 
ambiguity [19, p. 112]. Whilst Galbraith takes a n information processing view, 
Hofstede emphasizes subjective attitudes towards situations where little information is 
available. Both views can be combined to form the view that the basic information 
gathering tasks required for successful innovation differ in emphasis according to the 
level of perceived uncertainty [18, p. 65]. According to Hofstede, in Japan, 
uncertainty avoidance tendencies can be expected to be higher than in Germany [19, 
p. 122]. Consequently, in Japanese projects, a greater need to avoid ambiguity can be 
















































managers may tend to have a bias towards planning to reduce the possibility of 
failures [18, p. 64]. Furthermore, Japanese managers tend to define roles and 
responsibilities clearly, they also apply standardized procedures and draw upon a 
variety of tools and methods in innovation projects of high uncertainty [19, p. 264].    
2  Study 
2.1  Aim of the exploratory study 
Most of large scale empirical studies of the fuzzy front end, as well as large scale 
cross-national comparative studies form part of the research on success factors for 
New Product Development, where most of the activities during the fuzzy front end 
were combined under one heading like “pre-development activities” [1, p. 26, 7, p. 
433, 20, p. 3] but not outlined in any further detail. This exploratory study tries to 
develop a deeper understanding of the major tasks to be undertaken during the fuzzy 
front end – to reduce project uncertainties, e. g. related to market or technology. In 
addition, former studies indicate that besides company or project specific contextual 
factors like company size or degree of newness of a project, cultural differences might 
influence innovation related activities including the front end [21, pp. 2–4, 14, p. 530, 
7, p. 432, 22, p. 5, 23, p. 222]. Therefore, the second objective of our exploratory 
study was to determine initial indicators of cultural differences in terms of the way 
that uncertainties are reduced at the start the innovation process. Germany and Japan 
were chosen because literature indicates differences in innovation management 
practices, particularly with regard to uncertainty avoidance [18, 19, 21, 24].  
The aim and methodology of our study and a description of the samples are presented 
in the following section. The third section summarizes findings of our study. In 
chapter four, we formulate initial propositions, highlight managerial implications and 
make suggestions for future research. 
 
2.2  Methodology 
To reduce the complexity of our study, we focus on companies that are in similar 
industrial sectors and assume consistency in terms of sector related contextual factors. 
In Germany, we identified a total of 102 mechanical and electrical engineering 
companies located in the state of Hamburg by using the Hoppenstedt database [25]. 
All of these companies were contacted by telephone. Seven mechanical engineering 
companies and seven electrical engineering companies agreed to participate in our 
study. Finally, 14 in-depth interviews were conducted with the managers responsible 
for the development of new products during 2001. 
In Japan, MOST (Management of Science and Technology Department) at the 
Tohoku University in Sendai contacted 28 mechanical and electrical engineering 
companies. 13 companies agreed to participate. In one large electrical engineering 
company, two projects were analyzed. In sum, 14 in-depth interviews were conducted 
in 2002 with three mechanical and nine electrical engineering companies. For 
pragmatic reasons, given that it was difficult to convince Japanese companies to 
participate in research from outside Japan, the sampling procedure in Japan differed 
from the procedure in Germany. Hence, although the Japanese companies in our 7 
sample operate in the same industry as the German companies and hence, products 
and markets are comparable, differences in our sampling methodology somewhat 
limited the impact of our comparative results. 
Interviews lasted between two and three hours and were conducted by two 
interviewers in each country. The majority of the interviewees were directors of the 
Research and Development department (R&D) or general managers. In six 
companies, both, the R&D Director and Marketing Director were interviewed. In one 
of the Japanese companies, we were given the opportunity to interview the whole of 
the product development team. Interviews consisted of two parts: Firstly, interviewees 
were asked to briefly describe the development process and the outcome of the last 
product they had launched (last incident method) with the focus being on front end 
activities. The second part of the interview was solely based on a standardized 
questionnaire which was translated from German into Japanese for the interviews in 
Japan. The majority of the items were measured on a 7-point Likert scale. This two 
stage approach was designed to guarantee comparability of different interviews and to 
ensure that all of the issues perceived as being important by the interviewees could be 
addressed via the standardized questions. 
2.3  Sample 
A short description of all projects and respective companies is presented in the 
appendix to this paper. 
Company size: 
The German sample contains three large companies with 11,000, 200,000, and 
420,000 employees respectively and annual sales of over one billion Euros. However, 
the majority of the German sample consists of small and medium sized enterprises 
(SMEs) with 25 to 360 employees and annual sales between 2 and 77 million Euros. 
The Japanese sample is split equally between large companies with 2,500 to 10,000 
employees and annual sales mostly over one billion Euro and SMEs with 66 to 930 
employees and annual sales from 7 to 708 million Euros. On average, the Japanese 
companies are larger than the German companies. Therefore, one must consider that 
in the following analysis, differences in innovation management could, in addition to 
cross-national differences, be attributed in part to company size. 
Project scope: 
The average development time for new products developed was 20 months in 
Germany and 24 months in Japan. 
Degree of newness: 
Interviewees in both countries classified the newness of their product concepts and 
assessed the overall degree of newness of the product concept to their company (see 
figure 3). 
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Figure 3: Degree of newness 
Firstly, ten of 14 projects were classified as new product lines in Germany as well as 
in Japan. Secondly, regardless of whether using the classification of the product 
concept or the subjective overall rating, the newness of the Japanese product 
development projects got higher ratings of newness than German projects did. 
Thirdly, in both countries, the overall subjective assessment of the degree of newness 
to the company did not correspond to the (rather objective) classification of categories 
used in our questionnaire. For example, two cost saving projects were rated as highly 
new to the company. We came to the conclusion that there seems to be a general 
tendency to overestimate the degree of newness in an overall assessment of 
innovations. This conclusion is mirrored to a large extent by a recent German large 
scale study by Schlaak, in which 117 product development projects, of which the 
assessment of the overall degree of newness lead to high and homogeneous values, 
whereas a multi-dimensional measurement lead to lower and more differentiated 
values [16, p. 210]. 
Interviewees were asked to describe, which were the major areas of uncertainty in the 
product development projects in more detail. As already indicated by the degree of 
newness of the product concept (see figure 3), overall, uncertainties were perceived as 
higher in the Japanese projects. For the Japanese as well as the German projects, 
technology was the major source of uncertainty, but only on an average level in the 
German projects. In several of the German projects, there was a need to build new 
production lines, which was a further source of technological uncertainty. 
Corresponding to the fact that half of the Japanese projects were classified as new to 
the world (see figure 3), the target market and customers for the new products differed 
from markets already served by the Japanese companies. Regarding the German 
projects, most of the new products were introduced to existing markets.  
To summarize, the need to reduce uncertainties was lower for the German projects 
and was mostly restricted to technology. For more than half of the Japanese projects, a 












































Although we asked interviewees to describe the development of the last product 
introduced to the market, regardless of whether it was a success or failure, most of the 
projects in our sample were indeed successful. To assess the effectiveness of the 
projects, interviewees were asked, if objectives existed and if  yes, were they 
achieved? (see figure 4). The five objectives we interviewed them about were relevant 
to the majority of the German projects (between 12 and 14) and all of the Japanese 
projects. 
 
Figure 4: Achievement of objectives 
Overall, the effectiveness of the projects was fairly high regarding competitive 
advantage, customer satisfaction, fulfillment of technical requirements, and increased 
know-how. For these objectives, all Japanese and German projects either met or 
exceeded their targets. Deficiencies were only observed in terms of finance, where 
target profits were not reached in two of the German and six of the Japanese projects. 
In sum, all of the Japanese and German interviewees were satisfied with the outcome 
of the projects. Therefore, regardless of the way uncertainties were reduced, the 
respective approaches which are about to be outlined in the chapters that follow, were 
successful. 
3  Results 
This section summarizes our key findings about the fuzzy front end and tries to 
identify initial indicators for country specific differences. Firstly, we will describe 
how ideas were generated, assessed, and selected. Secondly, we will summarize to 
what extent market and technological uncertainty were reduced prior to project 
execution. Finally, we will describe the intensity of project planning activities as a 
further opportunity to reduce project related uncertainties and as a basis of controlling 
during the following steps of the product development process.  
As already mentioned in the previous section, the findings of our research are affected 
by several limitations, e.g., different sampling procedures in Germany and Japan and 
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differences between Japanese and German  projects, but if having completed the 
interviews we are under the strong impression that a difference exists which can be 
explained, and the difference between average values is relatively high to confirm our 
impression, these will be included. 
3.1  Idea generation 
The idea generation process is a combination of an organizational need, problem, or 
opportunity with the purpose of satisfying this need, solving a problem, or capitalizing 
on an opportunity. Although, the generation of ideas is often a complex and creative 
task, some researchers recommend reducing this uncertainty by assigning the tasks of 
systematic gathering, storing, and transferring all idea related information to specific 
individuals.  
But since a greater number of ideas can often be more efficiently and systematically 
created by teams or groups, it is often recommended that systematic procedures like 
creativity techniques [see 25 for an overview of creativity techniques] and team based 
techniques (like brainstorming) should be applied. On the other hand, some authors 
claim that individual idea generation produces more creative solutions than those 
from groups [27, p. 289]. However, most authors favor an interdisciplinary group for 
idea generation [28, p. 40, 26, pp. 284, 294–296, 29, p. 656, 27, p. 289, 20, p. 9]. 
R&D and marketing as well as other functions (e.g., production, customer service) 
should cooperate early on in this creative process. Such a multidisciplinary integration 
ensures that customer needs and technological capabilities are taken into sufficient 
consideration, even in the early stages of the innovation process [29, p. 656]. A joint 
understanding and shared goals concerning the innovation, early in the process will 
have a positive influence on the project or even foster the information transfer 
between departments and therefore reduce uncertainties. 
A general and vital precondition for all of these activities is that employees 
(individuals and teams) have sufficient time at their disposal to either collect relevant 
information or search for new ideas in addition to performing their regular business 
activities [27, p. 291, 28, p. 41]. 
Our findings concerning idea generation in the context of companies in both countries 
are presented in figure 5. They indicate differences in the way German and Japanese 
companies manage the idea creation process for new products.  
Whereas the 14 Japanese projects were supported more in terms of systematic 
procedures and tools (such as a systematic information management process or the 
use of creativity techniques), the 14 German projects are characterized by a stronger 
emphasis on interdisciplinary teams and scope for the employees to generate new 
ideas.  
Whilst only three of the 14 ideas in Germany, which suffered from limited resources 
in small enterprises, were not generated by an interdisciplinary team, six of the 
Japanese ideas were generated by one solitary function. These six ideas occurred in 
medium or large enterprises so that restriction to one function cannot be made 
accountable for, due to limited resources. Furthermore, the Japanese companies 
clearly favored allocating responsibility to a single competent person within one 
function, whilst the German companies clearly preferred a team approach to 11 
generating ideas for product development. This finding was somewhat surprising, 
since we had expected an equally or perhaps an even more team oriented approach in 
the case of information processing in the Japanese sample. One interpretation of these 
findings is that the Japanese Companies in our research try to encourage individuals 
and teams of people from various functions to collect and process ideas.  
Our present study corresponds with former findings about the rare use of tools and 
methods to support generation of new ideas in the Western culture [30, p. 13, 31, p. 
114, 32, pp. 11–13] in contrast to the frequent use of brainstorming in Japan [33, p. 
26]. In 11 out of 14 German projects, creativity techniques were not used at all, 
whereas in 12 of the Japanese projects, brainstorming was applied. (In contrast, a 
comparative study in the chemical industry showed that creativity techniques were 
more often used in Germany than in Japan. Corresponding to our study, brainstorming 
was the most commonly used creativity technique [24, p. 129].) 
 
 
Figure 5: Idea generation 
Overall, our research indicates differences in the way Japanese and German 
companies organize their idea generation processes. Whilst the Japanese managers 
assigned clear responsibilities to individuals as well as to teams and made use of 
systematic procedures including creativity techniques to reduce uncertainties early in 
the process, in the case of the German projects, ideas were generated by 
interdisciplinary teams, mostly not applying any specific procedures or such 
techniques. Instead these teams had been allocated sufficient time (scope) to develop 
ideas for innovation. 
3.2  Idea assessment 
Idea assessment is necessary to decide on the execution of an idea or to select the 
most promising idea from alternatives. The importance of this step within the product 
development process is empirically supported by studies in Western countries as well 
as in Japan and other countries [34, p. 82, 1, p. 25, 35, p. 119, 14, p. 540, 7, p. 431]. 
Given that decisions frequently have to be made without having all of the relevant 
information to hand, idea assessment is a necessary step in the innovation process, but 
it is accompanied by a high degree of uncertainty. The more radical the innovation 
project, the more difficult an early assessment of an idea becomes.   
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As in the case of idea generation, some authors recommend taking an interdisciplinary 
approach to idea assessment to ensure that all facets and perspectives are taken into 
consideration and that uncertainties are reduced as far as is possible [36, pp. 154–156, 
20, p. 9]. In this case, such a team has to develop a rich set of criteria in order to 
effectively evaluate the list of ideas created by individuals or teams. Such criteria 
typically address technical and/or economical aspects. Furthermore, some  studies 
have identified a proficient financial analysis to be a major success factor for 
innovation [37, p. 42, 38, pp. 187–189, 14, p. 540]. But such an analysis needs a 
minimum level of concrete ideas, of course. Unfortunately such rich data is hardly 
ever available for breakthrough type innovations during the early phase of the 
innovation process, the “fuzzy front end”. 
The results of our research paint the following picture: Firstly, six of the 14 
companies in Germany (five of the 14 companies in Japan) were in a position where 
the New Product Development project was already scheduled anyway. One of the 
companies, e.g., had to adapt to a technical change in the target market. These six 
(five) companies assessed the idea but did not have to select between alternatives. 
Hence, in the following analysis, only the remaining eight (nine) companies which 
had built in a project selection step into their product development process have been 
considered. 
Regarding the interdisciplinary approach to idea assessment, as in the case for the 
German projects (see figure 6), the findings are slightly misleading. All three projects 
managed by one function are included in the sample of 14 projects for idea generation 
and eight projects for idea assessment. The decrease in m ean values in  figure 6  
compared to figure 5 is therefore caused by having a smaller sample. In Germany, all 
ideas that were selected by an interdisciplinary team were already generated by 
multiple functions. In Japan, similar to our results with regard to idea generation, the 
level of multidisciplinarity for idea assessment was slightly lower than in Germany. 
 
Figure 6: Idea assessment 
In Germany, idea selection took place in meetings, where the various functions of the 
company were represented. Only one company held a meeting with participants from 
one department only. To the contrary, in Japan, five of the nine ideas were assessed 
during meetings with participants from one function only (like R&D, production or 
marketing/sales). This early assessment included discussions concerning the technical 
as well as economical attractiveness of the projects. At first glance, it seems surprising 
that although the Japanese culture is supposed to be more collectivist than the German 
culture, in our study the German p rojects were characterized by a more 
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the results, as the Japanese projects had a medium to high degree of newness to the 
firms, involving people from different functions may offer the opportunity to integrate 
diverse information and perspectives, but will also lengthen the process substantially, 
due to the collectivist element to be expected in such meetings. This view is supported 
by recent research that suggests that Japanese managers are willing to spend a 
substantial amount of time achieving group consensus in a harmonious setting [18, p. 
66]. But in order to run such evaluation sessions effectively, it makes sense that in the 
14 Japanese projects, various meetings were held during the fuzzy front end, but 
mostly between people in one function: Implementing this approach, enables them to 
achieve a much faster consensus of opinion on development issues. 
Table 1 shows the importance of technical and economical criteria for the assessment 
of an idea in Germany and Japan. Most of the companies considered technical as well 
as economical criteria (16 of 17) and therefore tried to base their decisions on 
minimum technological and market/economical uncertainty. 
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sum  -  -  9  9 
Table 1: Importance of technical and economical selection criteria 
Concerning the methodological support of idea assessment, in about half of the 
German as well as the Japanese projects, selection criteria used were weighted (see 
figure 7). An  analysis of cost effectiveness seems standard for Japanese projects 
regardless of company size. In Germany, only one medium sized and two larger 
companies carried out an analysis of cost effectiveness. A comparative study in the 
chemical industry showed different results. Whilst the weighting of criteria was more 
common in Japan than in Germany, no significant differences were found with regard 
to cost effectiveness analysis [24, pp. 140–142]. Nevertheless, a stronger 
methodological support of idea assessment in Japan is a similarity that was also found 
in other studies from different industry sectors. 
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Figure 7: Methodological support of idea assessment 
To summarize, whereas in the German projects, ideas were often assessed during 
meetings with participants representing various functions, in the case of the Japanese 
projects, meetings were held with participants from one function only. In both 
countries, idea assessment relied on technical and economic criteria which were 
weighted in about half of the cases. Whilst a cost effectiveness analysis seems 
standard in Japan, only a few larger enterprises in Germany elaborately calculated 
costs. Again, as for idea generation, in the Japanese projects the use of methods was 
emphasized whereas in the German projects interdisciplinary teams were used to 
reduce uncertainties during decision making.       
3.3  Reduction of market uncertainty prior to development 
After selecting an idea to be worked out in more detail, market uncertainty has to be 
reduced further, which should lead to a more in-depth understanding of the market. 
The target market has to be defined and customer requirements integrated into the 
product concept, prior to development [39, p. 274, 6, p. 26, 1, p. 26, 3, p. 113, 40, p. 
198, 7, p. 427]. For new markets, it is more difficult to reduce market uncertainty as 
potential customers are often unable to articulate their needs or may not even be 
aware of them [10, p. 228]. Therefore, we expected the challenge to be higher for the 
Japanese projects of our sample as they were characterized as “new to the world” 
products for at least half of the cases. 
One possibility to reduce market uncertainty is to extensively use customer or user 
information for developing the new product concept. This type of information can 
either be gathered by direct contact with customers or by relying on functions 
operating closely with client organizations such as after sales/customer service.  
The amount of information from these functions in our sample was similar in Japan 
and Germany,  on average on a medium level  (see figure 8). Direct contact to 
customers was more important for the initiation of German as well as Japanese 














analysis was made.15 
Figure 8: Initiation 
Overall, our findings with regard to initiation resemble the results of a large scale 
cross-national comparison between Germany, Japan, and the United States [41, pp. 
311–313]. 
Figure 9  reflects the results of our study with regard to the achieved market 
uncertainty reduction at the end of the “fuzzy front end”. For the Japanese as well as 
for the German projects, the remaining market uncertainty prior to development was 
relatively low. The target market and customer needs were well understood before the 
proceeding with development. We are under the impression, that in the Japanese 
projects the customer requirements played a slightly more important role in defining 
the product compared to the German projects. This might be explained by the fact, 




Figure 9: Reduction of market uncertainty prior to development 
To summarize, reduction of market uncertainty prior to development was achieved in 
the majority of projects both in Japan and Germany. 
3.4  Reduction of technical uncertainty prior to development 
Besides reducing market uncertainty, reducing technological uncertainty is a further 
key task during the fuzzy front end. For both samples this was a major task, as the 28 
projects were characterized by a medium to high degree of newness. This means that 
interviewees felt unable to predict or completely understand some aspects of the 
technological environment at the very beginning [18, p. 61].  For example, some 
interviewees perceived the product technology as under-developed and unknown and, 
thus, a trial and error research was considered unavoidable.  
According to Moenaert et al., the amount of information acquired with regard to 
technology is a key differentiating factor between successful and unsuccessful 
projects. [9, p. 249]. The NewProd studies of Cooper and Kleinschmidt indicate a 
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strong correlation between preliminary technical assessment and project outcomes 
[34, p. 82]. In Cooper and Kleinschmidt’s measurement, preliminary technical 
assessment includes, among other things, a feasibility analysis and the definition of 
product specifications. In NewProd, preliminary technical assessment was undertaken 
in 85 % of projects and was regarded as effectively undertaken. Song and Parry 
likewise report a highly significant correlation between technological information 
prior to development (measured with six items) and project success in Japan [7, p. 
431]. 
Our results paint a similar picture. Technical uncertainty prior to development was 
relatively low for the German and Japanese projects  (see figure 10). Technical 
requirements were not defined in two projects, and technical feasibility was not 
verified in one of fourteen German projects. In all of the Japanese projects 
requirements were defined and technical feasibility was checked at least to some 
extent. 
To summarize, reduction of technical uncertainty prior to development was achieved 
in the majority of the projects studied with no indication for cultural differences. 
 
 
Figure 10: Reduction of technical uncertainty prior to development 
 
3.5  Front end project planning 
When the overall objective of a New Product Development project is clear, an initial 
planning before the start of the development of the new product translates the overall 
project goals into a series of activities and allocates resources to these activities. 
Although some information needed for the planning may at that point in time be 
difficult to forecast, overall uncertainties are reduced by laying out a rough process 
from development to product launch.  
The first step of front end project planning is to break the product development 
project down into various work packages. Thereafter, timings, resources and overall 
responsibilities are allocated to the work packages. In addition, cost projections 
should be made and responsibilities should be assigned on an individual basis. The 
task of project planning can be supported by several tools and methods like bar charts, 
network plans, or project management software [42, p. 73]. Several large scale studies 
suggest that a proficient planning contributes significantly to the success of projects in 
Western countries [13, p. 279, 42, p. 67, 40, p. 198]. Song and Parry identified similar 
results for Japan [7, p. 432]. Khurana and Rosenthal’s exploratory study of 
incremental innovation projects in the U.S., Europe, and Japan observed deficiencies 























delays and product strategy mismatches [3, p. 111]. Results from Hofstede and Song 
et al. suggest that the intensity of the planning activities during the Japanese projects 
can be attributed to a higher level of  uncertainty avoidance than is common in 
Germany [19, 18]. 
In our study, project planning is a front end activity that reveals clear differences in 
the management of Japanese and German projects and supports our proposition based 
on the studies from Hofstede and Song et al. (see figure 11).  
 
Figure 11: Front end project planning 
In every aspect of project planning, average values were higher for the 14 Japanese 
projects. Two of the German projects did not even have a front end project planning 
step at all. As expected, this was the case for product development projects in small 
firms (25/140 employees) and r esulted in low project efficiency. The three large 
enterprises in our German sample carried out detailed planning for every aspect. 
Nevertheless, differences between German and Japanese projects cannot be explained 
by company size. In Japan, smaller enterprises had the same front end planning 
standard than larger enterprises. This country specific difference is abundantly clear 
for cost projections and flow charts, which were routinely utilized in all of the 
Japanese projects but in contrast, were an exception in Germany. This is consistent 
with our findings about the routine use of cost effective analysis in the Japanese 
sample compared to the German sample. Similarities between Japanese and German 
projects had already indicated in previous research that there is rarely project 
management software support for front end planning [43, pp. 155–157]. In Germany, 
four companies used project management software, whereas, to our surprise, such 
software was not used at all in the Japanese companies, where in some cases they 
were completely unaware that such tools existed.  
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Interviewees were asked to assess not only the assessment of individual steps of front 
end planning, but also the overall proficiency of their front end planning. The average 
value for the German sample was surprisingly high compared to the assessment of 
individual planning issues, as well as compared to the overall assessment of the 
Japanese projects. Obviously, many of the German interviewees did not attach much 
importance to front end planning, w hilst it was a routine step in the new product 
development process for the Japanese projects. 
Overall, in our study, the most predominant differences between our Japanese and 
German sample was due to the management of fuzzy front end planning. Whilst 
proficient planning, including cost projections and flow charts seems standard for 
Japanese projects, regardless of firm size, the proficiency of front end planning is 
lower and divergent between the projects studied in Germany. 
Given that the front end planning research revealed such interesting insights, we have 
decided to present the results of our study regarding controlling too, despite it not 
being a front end task. However, as controlling is based on deliverables defined 
during the fuzzy front end, differences between Japanese and German management 
practice can be expected to be found during controlling in the later phases of the 
process. In addition, as for planning, differences in uncertainty avoidance tendencies 
suggest a stricter approach to controlling in Japan than in Germany. 
One of the principle controlling tasks is to detect deviations from the plans as early as 
possible. Furthermore, reasons for deviations should be ascertained, the impact 
assessed and a corrective action plan developed [44, p. 216]. 
Consistent with our proposition and findings about project planning, the proficiency 
of controlling is significantly higher in our Japanese sample compared to our German 
sample (see figure 12). Regardless of company size, the Japanese firms allocated 
substantially more effort in drawing up plans and controlling them. 
 
 
Figure 12: Controlling 
To summarize, similar to idea generation and assessment, initial planning is a more 
routine practice in the 14 Japanese projects of our study. Some of the 14 German 
projects did not have a front end planning step at all and support by methods and tools 
was the exception, whilst the Japanese interviewees drew flow charts for example as a 
matter of routine. 
4  Conclusions 
Despite the sample size being small and different sampling methods being utilized in 
Germany and Japan, our study revealed some interesting results. Contrary to former 
studies, the fuzzy front end of 14 projects studied in Japan and 14 projects studied in 
Germany were predominantly managed proficiently. Market uncertainty and technical 
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1 = strongly disagree, 4 = neutral, 7 = strongly agree19 
uncertainty could have been substantially reduced prior to development. The majority 
of objectives were achieved for all projects. Yet, with regard to uncertainty reduction, 
in agreement with former findings about uncertainty avoidance in both countries, a 
different approach was identified in the Japanese sample, compared to the German 
projects. Whilst Japanese projects relied on a thorough planning and a strict  regime of 
control to minimize deviations from front end specifications and enhance efficiency, 
in our German projects, functions were integrated early in the innovation process, in 
some cases already during idea generation phase, to ensure that all information and 
perspectives were taken into consideration right from the start. Responsibilities were 
assigned during the front end and rarely changed during project implementation to 
reduce deviations and enhance efficiency. 
In summary, we suggest the following propositions for the “fuzzy front end”: 
Proposition 1: In  Japanese New Product Development projects, project related 
uncertainties are reduced via strong methodological support and in particular a more 
elaborated planning model compared to German New Product Development projects. 
Proposition 2: The early integration of corporate functions into the fuzzy front end of 
innovation to reduce project related uncertainty is more typical for German 
compared to Japanese innovation management style. 
Proposition 3: Monitoring and controlling of budgets, timing and resources during 
the whole innovation process (including the fuzzy front end) is systematically carried 
out in Japanese companies and more elaborated in contrast to German companies. 
For the management of innovation practice, our results indicate that there is no such 
thing as the “best” approach to reduce market and technological uncertainty and to 
successfully manage the fuzzy front end of innovation. In general, a company can 
choose either a more formal or a more interdisciplinary, informal approach. This 
decision will depend, besides other influencing factors, on the  culture of the 
enterprise. When deciding on the most appropriate approach for a given company, one 
of the key points of consideration should be employee attitudes towards uncertainty. 
If employees tend to be risk averse, formal procedures and a tight planning/control 
process might be more appropriate than a rather informal network approach. 
But due to the limited sample size of our study and different sampling procedures, our 
findings cannot be generalized. Nevertheless, initial indicators for country specific 
approaches to managing the fuzzy front of innovation were found. These findings 
suggest a contingency approach: The influence of contextual factors on the fuzzy 
front end should be considered in more detail and the sample size should be extended 
to enable a more elaborated analysis. Furthermore, studies of the fuzzy front end 
could be extended to other countries and industries. In particular, a comparison 
between countries with a more pronounced difference in terms of uncertainty 
avoidance tendencies, e.g., Japan and the U.S., would be promising. Another fruitful 
research area would be to explore the impact of uncertainty avoidance tendencies on 
individual behavior in more detail. 20 
Appendix: List of projects 
No.  Type of company and size 
(number of employees) 
Rough description of the project  Newness of the 
product concept to 
the firm and 
development time 
1  Japanese manufacturer of 
electronic components  
(150 employees) 
Power resistor with temperature 
characteristics based on metal foil 
technology 
New to the world,  
12 months 
2  Japanese manufacturer of 
electrical products  
(600 employees) 
Pointing device for personal computers 
(“mouse” ) for patients who suffer 
from muscle dysfunctions 
New to the world, 
2 months 
3   Japanese manufacturer of 
electronic components  
(4000 employees) 
Three dimensional motion sensor, used 
for example to protect PCs or mobile 
phones from physical damages (e.g., 
via deactivating the device in the case 
of slipping from a table) 
New product line, 
12 months 
4  Japanese manufacturer of 
transistors and IC products  
(930 employees) 
Switching element for communication 
products (e.g., telephones, mobile 
phones); triggering device for pulse 
ignitions 
New product line, 
4 months 
5  Japanese producer of 
chemical products  
(2465 employees) 
Polymer used in the production of 
optical lenses or eye glasses 
New to the world, 
120 months 
6  Japanese manufacturer of 
electronic components and 
products  
(123 employees) 
Electronic device to purify water for 
home and professional applications 
(e.g., laboratories, medical doctors or 
dentists) 
New to the world, 
10 months 
7  Japanese industrial 
automation company  
(6000 employees) 
Production in-process control system 
with special characteristics (e.g., 
constant imaging) 
New to the world, 
12 months 
8  Japanese manufacturer of 
tools  
(66 employees) 
Innovative tool for the effective 
manufacturing of airplane panels 
New to the world, 
5 months 
9  Japanese manufacturer of 
tools  
(240 employees)  
New machine to produce ceramic and 
plastic components (used by 
manufacturers of electronic devices, 
e.g., mobile phones) 
Repositioning in the 
market, 
36 months 
10  Japanese manufacturer of 




New product line, 
36 months 21 
 
11  Japanese manufacturer of 
electrical products  
(10.000 employees) 
eDRAM for PCs and digital cameras  Product modification, 
24 months 
12  Japanese manufacturer of 
electrical components and 
products 
(10.000 employees) 
Laser machine for the semiconductor 




13  Japanese manufacturer of 
process equipment  
(800 employees) 
Cleaning technology for LSI/FPD 
manufacturing (water treatment 
process) 
New to the world, 
24 months 
14  Japanese manufacturer of 
electrical products  
(10.000 employees) 
A new CVD technology, used to 
replace chemical and/or mechanical 
edging of  DRAMS and circuit design 
Product modification, 
24 months 
15  German manufacturer of 
electrical and electronic 
components and products 
(200000 employees) 
Sensor for measuring spark plug 
temperature 
New to the world, 
12 months 
16  German automobile 
manufacturer 
(420000 employees) 




17  German manufacturer of 
pumps 
(25 employees) 
Special pumps for  industrial purposes 
 
New to the world, 
6 months 
18  German manufacturer of 
equipment for printing 
machines 
(160 employees) 
Machine to dry printing ink  New to the world, 
30 months 
19  German manufacturer of 
pumps 
(125 employees) 
Rotary pump  Product modification, 
12 months 
20  German manufacturer of 
hearing aids 
(70 employees) 
Hearing aid with rechargeable battery  New product line, 
6 months 
21  German manufacturer of 
installation equipment for 
the shipping industry 
(50 employees) 
Headlights for the deck of a ship/ships  New product line, 
42 months 
22  German manufacturer of 
equipment for tyre 
production 
(350 employees) 
Machine used for tyre production  New product line, 
30 months 
23  German manufacturer of 
apparatus for gas analysis 
and level measuring 
(174 employees) 
Apparatus for gas analysis with special 
characteristics 
New to the world, 
24 months 22 
24  German engineering 
company of equipment for 
bulk handling 
(75 employees) 
Low priced metering roller  Cost reduction, 
6 months 
25  German manufacturer of 
ships and off-shore 
equipment 
(360 employees) 
Fire protection device for air 
conditioning systems on ships 
New product line, 
18 months 
26  German manufacturer of 
special drilling machines 
(140 employees) 
Laser machine (first laser machine 
developed in the firm) 
New product line, 
30 months 
27  German manufacturer of 
medical technology 
(11000 employees) 
Low priced high voltage generator for 




28  German manufacturer of 
power machines and drives 
(100 employees) 
Electric drives for ships  New product line, 
36 months 23 
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